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Stepwise Development and Verication of a Boiler System
Specication
Peter Bishop and Glenn Bruns and Stuart Anderson
Abstract
The rigorous development and verication of a boiler system specication is presented.
Part I shows how the boiler system controller can be developed in a series of elaboration
steps in which variables that directly reect plant conditions are replaced by variables
representing sensed, communicated values. Part II shows how the safety of the system
can be assessed by rst verifying safety relative to some failure assumptions and then
estimating the likelihood that the assumptions hold.
1 General Introduction
In attempting to demonstrate the safety of the Generic Boiler System, two main
problems are faced. First, there are a wide range of possible failures that can occur. For
example, the physical devices themselves can fail, sensors can fail, and sensed values can
be delayed or lost in transmission. Taking careful account of all possible failures is
dicult. A second problem, common to all safety-critical systems, is that absolute safety
cannot be shown. One can only hope to demonstrate partial or probable safety. However,
estimates of the probability of safety are hard to calculate, and it is hard to know
whether one can place much condence in them.
The approach demonstrated here addresses both of these issues. We present a stepwise
approach to the development of the boiler monitoring and control system. Initially, we
present an idealised controller that observes plant variables directly. Successive steps
make weaker assumptions, until nally we arrive at a specication in which only sensor
values received from the data communications system are observed. At each step, safety
of the boiler system is maintained. In this way, failures are treated systematically.
The second part of our approach is a separation of the deterministic and probabilistic
parts of the safety analysis. Safety is proved of the boiler system absolutely, under certain
assumptions that are believed to nearly always hold. Next, the likelihood of these
assumptions actually holding is estimated to give an overall probability of safety.
Our report has two parts. In Part I, the technique of step-wise elaboration of the boiler
controller is demonstrated. In Part II, verication of safety and failure properties is
shown for a boiler system model developed at a late step of elaboration. We do not
present code of the boiler controller, only a specication. However, this specication is
realistic in the sense that device failure and shutdown conditions are determined by
values received from the data communication system.
Part 1 - Step-Wise Derivation of a Boiler System
Specication
Peter Bishop, Adelard, UK
1 Introduction
This part intended to illustrate the value of a step-wise approach for the derivation and
validation of a specication using the Generic Problem as an example.
The basic strategy is to start with a model of the plant. Initially we model the
unconstrained behaviour of the plant where the plant may exhibit any physically feasible
behaviour. We then need to identify the permissible set of safe behaviours: the safety
constraints and, for the successful working of the plant, we also need to identify the
normal operating constraints (see gure 1).
Given these basic denitions we now need to consider how this top-level set of
requirements is elaborated into a software specication. We do this by constructing
successive models of the control system which can satisfy the top-level constraints.
In considering the physical plant and equipment we need to model failures as well as ideal
operation. In order to demonstrate safety at a given level we may require extra
assumptions that constrain the behaviour of that model. For example, it may be
necessary to assume that only a single failure will exist at any given time, or that failures
are always detected. Obviously these assumptions are not always correct but we should
be able to compute the probability of violating the design assumptions.
So nally we should be able to derive a specication of the software function that should
satisfy the plant safety constraints provided the additional equipment-related
assumptions are true. We can then estimate the probability that the equipment-related
assumptions are violated in order to determine whether the system meets some
quantitative safety target.
It should be noted that the main intent is to illustrate the basic step-wise approach and
the reasoning behind the safety arguments. While the approach is expressed in a formal
notation, it does not claim to be rigorous.
The paper will primarily consider the elaboration of the safety specication for a
controller. However we shall also consider some aspects of the availability requirements
which have relevance to the Generic Problem Specication.
A comparison will be made between our specication and the controller required in the
Generic Problem Specication. Possible inconsistencies and omissions are discussed. We
also briey consider the analysis required to determine the probability of dangerous
failure that can occur when the design assumptions are violated.
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2 Formal Notation Employed
Lamport's TLA (Temporal Logic Algebra) [2] is used as the formal notation to represent
the boiler and control system behaviour. TLA can specify temporal formulae such as:
x = 0 ^ 2 x
0
= x+ 1. This would describe the a variable x that, on each transition step,
increments indenitely from a value of zero. The reader is referred to Part II of this
paper for a description of the semantics of TLA.
2.1 Denitions and conventions
We use ranges to represent most values because error and uncertainties need to be taken
into account. For example, a meter reading of x might be manipulated as a range
(x  err
min
; x+ err
max
). We also use the following notational conventions:
V
p
The physical limits of a plant variable (usually xed).
V
m
The measured value of a plant variable.
f
d
The failure state of plant component d.
r
d
The reported (diagnosed) failure state of plant component d.
Unless otherwise specied, ranges are normally represented by a single upper-case letter.
For convenience, the instantaneous value of plant variable is regarded as a range i.e.
V = (v; v) where v is the scalar plant value.
2.2 Range Operators
A range A is represented as a pair (x; y) in which x and y are real and x  y.
We dene some operations on ranges:
(x; y)
1
4 x
(x; y)
2
4 y
A  B 4 A
1
 B
1
^ A
2
 B
2
A+B 4 (A
1
+ B
1
; A
2
+B
2
)
A B 4 (A
1
  B
2
; A
2
 B
1
)
3 Boiler System Safety Requirement
3.1 Dening the Plant Model
The TLA notation is used dene a discrete-time model of the boiler (a schematic of the
plant is shown in gure 2). We can choose to interpret the transitions as taking place at
2
xed time intervals. The interval between time instants is arbitrary, but to make life
easier, we shall interpret the successive instants as the plant interface sampling time
points (5 second intervals). This is suciently small to capture most boiler dynamics,
and simplies the equations used for the various levels of modelling.
In dening the plant behaviour we will use the following plant variables:
L boiler content level
S steam ow per unit time
D drain ow per unit time
P pump ow per unit time
np number of operating pumps
t the current time
and the following constants:
Safe
p
safe static boiler level range
Safe safe shutdown level range (dynamic operation)
K pump ow per pump
L
p
physical limits of boiler level
P
p
physical limits of net pump ow
S
p
physical limits of steam ow
S
p
physical limits on change of steam ow / unit time
The boiler model is dened as:
Boiler 4 L
0
= L+ P
0
  S
0
 D
0
^ P = K  np
^ L  L
p
^ S  S
p
^ S
0
  S  S
p
^ P  P
p
^ t
0
= t + 1
The rst line of the denition is a mass balance equation where the change in level is the
dierence between the input and output ows. Subsequent lines specify constraints on the
physical values. The nal line models the passage of time for successive transitions. This
is not strictly needed for the plant model, but is relevant to time-dependent denitions in
the controller. It is included in the boiler model since it is a physical quantity.
For convenience, the maximum change in level L per unit time due to physical ow
limitations is dened as:
L
p
= P
p
  S
p
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Note that this denition excludes the drain valve ow D since this only appears to be
used at system start-up, and there is no specication for the physical limits of the
maximum drain ow.
It should be noted that Part 2 uses a reduced boiler model which excludes timing and the
drain valve ow. However the models are equivalent under under the analysis
assumptions made in Part 2.
3.2 Establishing the Boiler System Safety Requirement
The plant model dened above can exhibit any arbitrary behaviour permitted by its
denition. In practice we wish to constrain its behaviour to meet some operational
criterion. The overall safety criterion for the boiler system is:
2L Safe
p
where L is the boiler level, Safe
p
is the physical range of levels for boiler safety.
At an abstract level we should be able to identify a `constraint behaviour' that can meet
this criterion. We then have to show that, given some safe initial condition, this
constrained behaviour always satises the plant safety property.
A more restrictive set of behaviours can be dened for maintaining plant availability, but
this not the major property of concern here. Some aspects of availability will be discussed
later.
3.3 Identifying the Shutdown Safety Boundary
At the top level of implementation, we have to identify a suitable constraint behaviour.
In the Generic Problem Specication, some form of shutdown action is taken. There is no
information about how the boiler actually shuts down, but since the plant cannot
shutdown immediately, we have to establish another range Safe such that:
L  Safe ^ 2 (Boiler ^ ShutBehaviour) ) 2L  Safe
p
Where ShutBehaviour is some arbitrary shutdown behaviour. One rather unlikely
example of ShutBehaviour could be:
ShutBehaviour 4 :(L  Safe) ) (S
0
= 0 ^ P
0
= 0 ^ D
0
= 0)
With this extremely idealized system, it is fairly clear that excursions will be halted one
time step beyond the Safe region. Since the shutdown occurs in a single time step, Safe
must satisfy:
Safe+ L
p
 Safe
p
4
where L
p
is the maximum change in level that is physically possible in one step.
In practice, the shutdown behaviour would be more complex and there would have to be
a greater margin between Safe and Safe
p
, i.e.:
Safe+ L
Shutdown
 Safe
p
but the same approach should be applicable. Note that the dynamic aspects of shutdown
have already been taken into account in the Generic Problem Specication, so the
specied range of Safe is assumed to have been veried.
3.4 Partitioning the Control System
Having identied the shutdown safety boundary, we can consider the structure of control
system to implement the safety and normal operation requirements. We can divide the
control system into two parts: a system which implements the plant shutdown behaviour
PlantShutdown, and a controller unit Shutdown which detects unsafe plant conditions
and also performs normal plant control actions. These two components are connected by
a signal up which is monitored by the PlantShutdown system. When the up signal is
false the boiler shutdown behaviour is triggered.
We can now consider these two systems separately. In particular, we can construct a
sub-model containing the Boiler model and the ShutDown model for which we wish to
show that:
2up ) L Safe
Or in other words, whenever the signal true, there is a safe level in the boiler. Provided
up is true initially, this specication, combined with the PlantShutdown specication
should ensure the overall safety criterion is always satised.
3.5 Elaboration Strategy
We now need to elaborate the design of the controller. The requirements for normal
operation are not considered, only those aspects relevant to safety, i.e. the value of up.
The basic approach to the design is a re-denition of Shutdown in a sequence of design
elaborations i. In the physical system hardware failures can occur, so we wish to ensure
the system is fail-safe i.e. shutdown will occur if the boiler limits are exceeded or if the
controller fails. so we dene the abstract signal up to be implemented by:
up 4 up
i
^ ok
i
Where variable ok
i
is used to represent an acceptable physical failure status. and up
i
represents the safety limit check implemented in terms of information available at that
level of elaboration. The implementation BSys
i
is dened as:
BSys
i
4 (up
i
^ ok
i
) ^ 2 (Boiler ^ ShutDown
i
)
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In producing that implementation we may also make a set of design assumptions
Assump
i
. In order for the implementation to satisfy the abstract safety specication we
have to show that:
BSys
i
^ Assump
i
) 2 (up
i
^ ok
i
) L  Safe)
It will be seen that at each stage of elaboration, additional uncertainty (or `fuzz') is
introduced regarding the water level position. It will also be seen that additional
assumptions have be made to accommodate the physical characteristics and failure modes
of the various controller subsystems.
3.6 Elaboration 1 - Plant Measurement
Obviously in the physical implementation, measured values will be used rather than the
true plant variables. This data acquisition process is modelled as:
Measure 4 t
m
= t
^ (:f
l
) L  L
m
)
^ (:f
s
) S  S
m
)
^ (:f
p
) np = ]i:(pm
i
^ pi
i
)
where the L
m
and S
m
are nominal accuracy ranges, pm
i
and pi
i
are independent
indications of whether pump i is on, and f
l
, f
s
and f
p
refer to the failure states of the
respective sensors.
In the simplest case we can just take the measured level L
m
. In this case this it is clear
that if up
1
= L
m
 Safe then:
(:f
l
^ up
1
) ) L  Safe
If ok
1
= :f
l
then the safety requirement is met. However the controller has no absolute
knowledge of device failure status: it has to rely on a reported failure status, r
l
, which is
based on some (unspecied) diagnosis Diag
l
of the measured values, i.e.:
ok
1
= :r
l
So we need an assumption:
Assump
1
4 f
l
) r
l
to obtain a valid value for ok
1
.
Like all assumptions, this may not be valid in practice, and the chance of the assumption
being violated will have be evaluated probabilistically. So the overall denition for
shutdown at this elaboration is:
ShutDown
1
4 Measure ^ Diag
l
^ up
1
= L
m
 Safe
^ ok
1
= :r
l
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3.7 Elaboration 2 - Data Fusion
For availability reasons, the Generic Problem requires operation to be maintained for as
long as is safely possible using available data. In order to achieve this we require a data
fusion approach where of faulty measurements are diagnosed based on the consistency of
the measurements. This topic is quite complex and is discussed in detail in Part 2.
However the general features of the data fusion process are:
 A consistency model for measured values.
 `Fusion' which identies all potentially failed devices (i.e./ the values of r
l
, r
s
, r
p
).
 A computation which utilizes the failure reports and measured values to compute a
bounding range, L
c
such that:
L  L
c
For convenience this whole process is termed the FusionProcess. With data fusion we
have to assume that the failure of all the sensors are detectable. In addition, data fusion
is probably impossible if there is ow through the drain valve (since it is not measured),
so we assume:
Assump
2
4 f
l
) r
l
^ f
s
) r
s
^ f
p
) r
p
^ D = 0
It is assumed that the fusion process can be characterized by a variable FusionOK, such
that:
FusionOK ) L  L
c
FusionOK will be false when it is impossible to compute L
c
. One example of this is
when the level measurement is initially faulty (t = 0 ^ r
l
), in this case there is no basis
for extrapolation using the steam and pump ow measurements.
So the overall shutdown denition is:
ShutDown
2
4 Measure ^ FusionProcess
^ up
2
= L
c
 Safe
^ ok
2
= FusionOK
3.8 Elaboration 3 - Eect of Communications
The communications system can corrupt a message, so correct measurements are only
received when there are no communications failures, i.e.:
Comms 4 :f
x
) Measure
7
where f
x
is the message corruption state. We assume there is sucient redundancy in the
message to perform a diagnosis of a faulty message, i.e.:
f
x
) r
x
where r
x
is the diagnosis.
Loss of messages eectively increases the time between measurement samples, and hence
the uncertainty in the current value of the level. In order to guarantee safety, we require
an upper limit on the interval between valid messages, t
x
, otherwise the worst case
change in level cannot be predicted, hence.
ok
3
4 ok
2
^ (t
0
m
  t)  t
x
where t
m
is the time of the last received message and t is the current time.
To detect the existence of valid messages, we need an extra assumption for this level:
Assump
3
4 Assump
2
^ f
x
) r
x
Taking the worst case changes permitted by the physical constraints, the range of
possible values for the level will expand by: L
p
t
x
where L
p
is the maximum possible
change in level per unit time. Thus the denition of the shutdown function is:
ShutDown
3
4 Comms ^ FusionProcess2
^ up
3
= L
c
+L
p
:t
x
 Safe
^ ok
3
= ok
2
^ (t
m
  t)  t
x
FusionProcess2 is an extension of the original fusion process which takes account the
variable communication delays.
3.9 Elaboration 4 - Computer System Hardware
Obviously computer hardware failures (represented by f
h
) will aect the safety
behaviour. In terms of the available information the system has to rely on r
h
, the
reported hardware failure status. Thus we can dene
ok
4
4 ok
3
^ :r
h
Hence we need to assume:
Assump
1
4 f
h
) r
h
in order to ensure that ok
4
is valid.
So at this level of the elaboration, the controller is dened as:
ShutDown
4
4 :f
h
) (Comms ^ FusionProcess)
^ up
4
= L
c
+L
p
:t
x
 Safe
^ ok
4
= ok
3
^ :r
h
8
3.10 Summary of the Elaboration Sequence
The following table shows the evolution of the design. For each implementation i,
(ok
i
^ up
i
) is necessary to avoid shutdown.
Model ok up Assumptions
Ideal true L  Safe
ShutDown
1
:r
l
L
m
 Safe f
l
) r
l
(measurement)
ShutDown
2
FusionOK L
c
 Safe f
l
) r
l
(+fusion) f
s
) r
s
f
p
) r
p
D = 0
ShutDown
3
ok
2
^ (t
m
  t  t
x
) L
c
+ L
p
t
x
 Safe Assump
2
(+comms) ^ f
x
) r
x
ShutDown
4
ok
3
^ :r
h
L
c
+ L
p
t
x
 Safe Assump
3
(+computer) ^ f
h
) r
h
It should be noted that further work is required to complete the elaboration. In
particular, the chain of communication of the up
i
signal to some physical actuation
system has not been addressed.
4 Availability Considerations
In practice, a controller that simply shuts down is of little practical use. So far there has
been no consideration of the behaviour under normal control conditions (`bang-bang'
control). To work indenitely, excursions must be prevented by making the level move in
the opposite direction (or at least stabilising the level) using the pumps. Inspection of the
engineering data shows that, by switching all four pumps on and o, level reversal (or at
least level stabilisation) is possible. This capability permits the bang-bang controller to
maintain the level with some nominal operating range, provided there is no ow out of
the dump valve. The status of the dump valve in normal operation is not stated in the
Generic Problem Specication, but it clearly must be closed or ow reversal cannot be
guaranteed at the lower safety limit.
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5 Impact of Plant Failures
We now have to consider whether this control behaviour can prevent excursions when
there are plant failures. The only physical plant failure is the failure of a pump, which
can either be `stuck-on' or `stuck-o'. It can be shown from the engineering data that
`bang-bang' control can only be maintained indenitely if there are no `stuck-on' pumps
and only one `stuck-o' pump. What this means in physical terms is that if a pump is
stuck-on and there is a low steaming rate, the water level keeps on rising until it hits the
upper safety limit. Similarly if there are two stuck-o pumps, the pump ow may not
keep up with the steaming rate so the water level can drop below the lower safety limit.
6 Comparison with the Generic Problem Specification
The Generic Problem Specication identies a number of states for the software
implementation. There are transition conditions between the states and certain specic
control actions are required in each state. In order to make a comparison, we analysed
the transition conditions in order to determine the `residence condition' and actions in
each state. The residence condition is essentially the union of all the entry conditions,
with all possible exit conditions removed. One feature that was noted when analysing the
state transition diagram was the variation of entry conditions for the same node when
entered from dierent source nodes. For instance, the `degraded mode' can be entered
with all sensors working from the `normal mode', but with a sensor missing when entered
from `emergency mode'.
The following features were observed this analysis:
 there are `health checks' on the hardware which can prevent normal operation
altogether. This is similar to our initial condition, where the system must be
ok ^ up before the system can operate.
 If the checks are satisfactory, the safety limit check (similar to our up
i
) is applied in
all operational states using dierent data fusion methods. Limit excursions cause
shutdown.
 Assuming there is no limit violation, normal control actions are performed.
 There are also transitions based on pump availability. This is directly related to our
availability analysis which shows that three pumps are required to maintain
availability.
 The `emergency' mode relates to the loss of the main level measurement, so some
form of data fusion is needed to calculate the current level.
 The check on loss of communication (t
m
  t) enforces the requirement about the
10
maximum interval between messages.
6.1 Potential Problems
In reviewing this specication, a number of potential problems have been identied.
 There is no recognition of the fact that a pump can be `stuck-on' since the Generic
Problem specication only includes fully usable pumps. As shown in the earlier
availability analysis, continued availability cannot be guaranteed with a stuck-on
pump. It might therefore be desirable to prevent start-up or immediately shut down
when the condition is identied (as it does when there are less than three pumps
working).
 There is no information about what happens to the drain valve during operation.
In order to maintain safety and availability it is essential for the drain valve to be
shut. There is no explicit control of this valve by the computer. Ideally it should
only be possible to open it in the `system test mode', but nothing is specied.
 The variation in the node entry conditions may indicate an inconsistency about
when to continue operating in the event of failures. Ideally there should be a set of
invariant conditions for the safety of the plant after initialisation. The only aspect
that might need to vary between modes is the operating status of the pumps.
7 Probabilistic Analysis
From the design assumptions and the modes of operation, we can construct a tree of
failures leading to a dangerous failure (i.e. a failure to shut down when the level is
potentially outside the safe limits). The actual structure of the tree will vary with the
approach to data fusion. Figure 3 shows an example tree where the fusion relies on the
level until it fails, then it uses the steam and pump ow measurements as an alternative.
Provided the deterministic reasoning is correct, the top event can only occur when an
assumption is violated. In our case, all these events are undetected failures, since
detected failures can be rendered safe.
Provided we can assign probabilities to these base events, we should be able to compute
the probability of the top event. To determine the probabilities we need to quantify:
 the failure modes and failure rates of the sensors and the other hardware systems.
 the detection eciency of the diagnostic algorithms.
 the repair time for reported failures.
 potential sources of common cause failure.
While no data are provided to determine these base probabilities, some qualitative
observations can be made.
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(1) There are many sources of common cause failure within the basic architecture
because the control and shutdown functions both rely on L
c
. A better system
design would have made the shutdown and control systems independent (e.g.
independent sensors and hardware) so that there would be a higher probability of
trapping control excursions (i.e. there is an AND at the top of the failure tree).
(2) The communications system is one potential source of failure that aects all
measured variables and yet the specied protocol has no simple way of checking the
integrity of the message. Reliance has to be placed on application-specic
knowledge (e.g. of the message contents, and credible values for variables). It would
have been better if some standard message integrity check could be incorporated
(e.g. CRC-32) whose diagnostic eciency is easily calculated for any specied level
of `noise'.
(3) The level measurement is obviously very important since it is the main line of
defence; the other variables are only signicant as standbys or consistency checkers.
Safety and availability could be improved by the use of multiple level sensors.
8 Conclusions
The stepwise approach to the design allows the system to be reasoned about at a number
of dierent levels. It allows the software specication to be related to specic features of
the design which impinge on safety, and there is a logical connection with the
probabilistic safety analysis.
With regard to the Generic Problem Specication itself, many of the features derived by
the stepwise analysis are analogous to features in the Problem Specication. However it
was noted that certain aspects of the plant that could aect plant safety were not
addressed, notably the control of the drain valve, and the treatment of `stuck-on' pump
failures.
From a more pragmatic viewpoint, I feel that the application of such an approach on a
real system would encourage designs that are simpler to analyse and directly address the
top-level safety objective. For example, in the present design, reliance is placed on a
knowledge of boiler dynamics in order to diagnose faults in the measurement devices, so
the controller sub-model has to incorporate a boiler model for analysis purposes. An
alternative controller design with internal measurement diagnostics (e.g. multiple level
sensors) could be treated as a standalone entity, which would simplify the model and
avoid the analysis complexities inherent in data fusion.
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Fig 1.  Behaviour of Hazardous Plant
S
D
P = K.np
LSafe Safe_p
np
Fig 2.  Generic Problem Plant Model
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AND
f h ¬ rh
OR
AND
f l ¬ r l
AND
f p ¬ r p
AND
f s ¬ r s
OR
AND
f l l
AND AND
f x  ¬ rx
r
¬  L      Safe⊆up ∧
Fig 3.  Failure Tree for Probabilistic Evaluation
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1 Introduction
To rigorously show that a safety-critical system is safe, one would like to take advantage
of the many existing system verication techniques. Unfortunately, this cannot be done,
at least directly, because no real system is absolutely safe | there is always at least a
remote chance that a component will fail. However, it is not necessary to reject logical
techniques in favour of wholly probabilistic ones. In this paper we show that the safety of
systems can be proved, relative to failure assumptions that hold only in a probabilistic
sense.
We demonstrate our approach by proving safety and other properties of a generic boiler
system [?], composed of a boiler, feed pumps, sensors, and a monitoring and control
system. We formally specify the plant and monitoring sub-systems, and show that the
system as a whole is safe relative to failure assumptions that state, for example, that if all
monitored values are consistent, in a precise sense, then no device has failed. We also
show some important failure reporting properties of the system.
2 Notation
We will use Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) to describe both the boiler
system and its properties. We briey describe TLA here; for more details see [?].
The atomic formulas of TLA are predicates and actions. A predicate is a boolean
expression build from variables and values, such as x > 1. A predicate can be regarded
semantically as a function from states to booleans, where a state is a mapping from
variables to values. An action is a boolean expression built up from variables, primed
variables, and values, such as x
0
= x+ 1. An action can be regarded semantically as a
relation on states, in which primed variables refer to a \new" state and unprimed
variables to an \old" state. Thus, x
0
= x+ 1 holds between two states if the value of x in
the new state is one greater than the value of x in the old state.
The syntax of TLA formulas is as follows, where P ranges over predicates and A ranges
over actions:
F ::= P 2A :F F
1
^ F
2
2F
1
A TLA formula is valid if it is satised by every innite sequence of states. Predicate P is
satised by sequence  if P holds for the rst state of . Action A is satised by  if A
holds for the rst pair (s
0
; s
1
) of states in . Formula :F is satised by  if F is not
satised by . Formula F
1
^ F
2
is satised by  if both F
1
and F
2
are satised by .
Finally, 2F is satised by  if F is satised by every sux of .
Systems are always represented in TLA by formulas of the form P ^2A, where P
represents an initial condition. For example, (x = 0)^ 2(x
0
= x+ 1) represents a system
in which x is initially 0 and is incremented in every successive state. To express the
correctness condition that a property F holds of a system Sys, we write Sys) F . For
example, letting Sys be the formula x = 0 ^2(x
0
= x+ 1), we write Sys) 2(x
0
> x) to
express that x increases in every successive state of Sys.
Some basic TLA proof rules, taken from [?], are listed in Appendix ??.
In modelling the boiler system it is convenient to have variables that represent a range of
values. For example, we model the measured boiler level as a range that takes the
possible measurement error into account. All model variables of type range have names
beginning with an upper-case letter. Formally, a range is a pair (x; y) in which x and y
are real and x  y. We dene some operations on ranges:
(x; y)
1
def
= x
(x; y)
2
def
= y
A  B
def
= A
1
 B
1
and A
2
 B
2
A [B
def
= (min(fA
1
; B
1
g);max(fA
2
; B
2
g))
A+B
def
= (A
1
+ B
1
; A
2
+B
2
)
A B
def
= (A
1
  B
2
; A
2
 B
1
)
jAj
def
= A
2
 A
1
Notice that ranges are closed under the   operator. We will later use the fact that + and
  are monotonic with respect to , so that A  B ) (A+ C)  (B + C), and similarly
for the   operator.
For convenience, certain plant variables that really represent scalar values are also
represented as ranges of the form (x; x).
3 Modelling the Boiler System
We now present a formal model of the boiler system, based on [?]. Roughly, our model
contains a part that models the physical plant and a part that species a plant monitor.
The plant monitor does not explicitly contain modes, but does perform the failure
detection and shutdown condition checking needed for passing between normal, degraded,
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emergency, and shutdown modes of operation. We model sensors and sensor failure, but
do not model data communications. Also, we do not model the boiler control scheme; the
safety properties we prove hold for any control scheme.
We begin by describing the model variables. Our specication contains the following
plant variables:
L boiler content level
S steam ow per unit time
np number of operating pumps
L
m
metered content level
S
m
metered steam ow rate
pi
i
motor on/o indicator for pump i
pm
i
monitor for pump i
the following control variables:
L
c
calculated boiler content level
S
c
calculated steam rate
P
c
calculated net pump rate
f
d
actual failure of device d
r
d
reported failure of device d
c
D
consistency of readings from devices in set D
up shutdown variable
and the following constants:
L
p
physical limits of boiler level
S
p
physical limits of steam ow
P
p
physical limits of net pump ow
Safe safe boiler level range
K pump ow per pump
The subscript d of variables f
d
and r
d
range over elements of Dev
def
= fl; s; pg, where l
stands for the content level meter, s stands for the steaming valve meter, and p stands for
the pumps. In writing a consistency variable c
D
, we abbreviate device sets as strings of
symbols from Dev, for example, we write c
sp
instead of c
fs;pg
.
The boiler system model has ve components, which model the boiler behaviour,
shutdown behaviour, data fusion, data consistency, and level determination. The boiler
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model states the relationships between physical plant variables, and also contains failure
assumptions:
Boiler
def
= L
0
= L+ (P
0
  S
0
)
^ P = K  np
^ S  S
p
^ P  P
p
^ :f
l
) L  L
m
^ :f
s
) S  S
m
^ :f
p
) np = ]i:pm
i
^
^
d2Dev
0
@
f
d
)
_
Dfdg
:c
D
1
A
^
^
DDev
0
@
:c
D
)
_
d2D
f
d
1
A
The model is a discrete approximation of the physical plant behaviour. The rst three
failure assumptions state that the meters are accurate in the absence of failure. The
fourth states that failure of a device d produces some inconsistency involving d. The nal
assumption states that every inconsistency is produced by some failed device.
We use the notation
V
i2I
F
i
rather than 8i 2 I:F
i
because we always quantify over nite
sets, and are therefore using only simple propositional logic, not predicate logic. The
notation ]i:F
i
denotes the number of i for which F
i
holds.
The shutdown model determines the value of the variable up, which holds whenever the
calculated boiler level is within the safe bounds:
Shutdown
def
= up = L
c
 Safe
The data fusion model determines the value of failure reporting variables. The model
states that if an inconsistency exists for some device set D, then all devices in D are
reported as failed. This pessimistic failure reporting strategy is necessary when
calculating a level range that is guaranteed to contain the actual boiler level.
Fusion
def
=
^
d2Dev
0
@
r
d
=
_
Dfdg
:c
D
1
A
Notice that the failure reporting strategy is given as a function of consistency conditions
only.
The consistency model states consistency conditions between device readings. Informally,
c
D
holds if the devices named in D give consistent values. Thus, c
l
holds if the level
4
meter reading taken alone is consistent, i.e., if it is not outside the possible physical
range. Similarly, c
sp
holds if the steam and pump readings are consistent. Note that
:c
d
1
d
2
does not imply :c
d
1
or :c
d
2
.
Cons
def
= c
s
= S
m
 S
p
^ c
p
= 8i:pm
i
= pi
i
^ c
l
= L
m
 L
p
^ c
sp
= true
^ c
sl
= true
^ c
pl
= true
^ c
0
spl
= L
0
m
 L
m
+ (K  (]i:pm
0
i
)  S
0
m
)
The nal component determines the estimated level variable from reported failures. The
calculated level is the best estimate of the actual level given the current reported failure
conditions. For example, if the level meter is not reported as failed, then the best
estimate of the actual level is by the level meter.
Level
def
= :r
0
l
) L
0
c
= L
0
m
^ r
0
l
) L
0
c
= L
c
+ (P
0
c
  S
0
c
)
^ :r
s
) S
c
= S
m
^ r
s
) S
c
= S
p
^ :r
p
) P
c
= K  (]i:pm
i
)
^ r
p
) P
c
= P
p
The action Step represents the combined behaviour of the preceding components:
Step
def
= Boiler ^ Shutdown ^ Fusion ^ Cons^ Level
The initial conditions include the conjunct L
c
= L, which states that we must initially
know the actual level of the boiler.
Init
def
= L
c
= L ^ L  Safe
The top-level boiler system description has the standard form of a TLA specication:
BSys
def
= Init ^2Step
4 Failure Properties
Reports of device failure in the boiler system model are based on the consistency of
sensor data. There are two important properties to show of the failure reports. First, if a
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failure occurs it should be reported. This is critical to the proof of safety. Letting D
r
be
the the set of devices reported as failed, and D
f
be the set of actually failed devices, the
property can be formalised as follows:
Pessimism
def
= 2(D
f
 D
r
)
Theorem 1 BSys) Pessimism
Proof.
D
f
= fd 2 Dev j f
d
g by denition of D
f
f
d
)
W
Dfdg
:c
D
in def. of Boiler
D
f
 fd 2 Dev j
W
Dfdg
:c
D
g propsitional logic, set theory
D
f
 fd 2 Dev j r
d
g by denition of r
d
D
f
 D
r
by denition of D
r
Clauses of Step were used to prove D
f
 D
r
, so by the deduction principle we have that
Step) D
f
 D
r
. TLA rule STL4 then gives us that 2Step) 2(D
f
 D
r
), and from
this BSys) Pessimism easily follows. 2
The second property is that if one or more devices are reported as failed, then at least
one of the reported devices must have actually failed. This property can be formalised as
follows:
No False Alarms
def
= 2(D
r
6= ; )
_
d2D
r
f
d
)
Theorem 2 BSys) No False Alarms
Proof. By denition, D
r
= fd 2 Dev j r
d
g. Expanding the denition of r
d
and
simplifying, we equivalently have that D
r
=
S
fD  Dev j :c
D
g. Writing the nitely
many elements of the set fD  Dev j :c
D
g as fD
1
; : : : ; D
n
g, we have that D
i
 D
r
and
that
W
d2D
i
f
d
for 1  i  n. Therefore, since D
r
6= ;,
W
d2D
r
f
d
. 2
5 Safety Properties
The most important property to show is that if the shutdown variable up is true, then the
boiler level is within its safe bounds. This notion of safety can be formalised in TLA as
the formula:
Safety
def
= 2(up) L  Safe)
Before proving the safety property we present a few lemmas. Of these, the third is the
most important, stating that the actual boiler level is always within the calculated level
range.
Lemma 1 Step) S  S
c
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Proof. Assume that Step holds. If :r
s
then S
c
= S
m
. By the Pessimism property we
know that :r
s
) :f
s
, and since :f
s
) S  S
m
, we have S  S
c
. If r
s
, then S
c
 S
p
, and
since S  S
p
, we have S  S
c
. Thus Step) S  S
c
. 2
Lemma 2 Step) P  P
c
Proof. We use a similar argument as in the proof to the previous theorem. If :r
p
, then
P
c
= K  (]i:pm
i
) and np = ]i:pm
i
, so P
c
= P . If r
p
, then P  P
c
just as for r
s
. 2
Lemma 3 BSys) 2(L  L
c
)
Proof. To simplify the proof, we use the following derived TLA proof rule (where I is a
predicate):
A ) Q I ^ (A ^ Q
0
)) I
0
I ^ 2A ) 2I
To see that the rule is sound, observe that we get 2A ) 2(A ^Q
0
) from the rst premise
by TLA rule STL4 and other rules of simple temporal logic, and that we get
I ^2(A^Q
0
)) 2I from the second premise and TLA rule INV1. Putting these together
gives the conclusion.
We dene R to be (:r
l
) :f
l
) ^ (S  S
c
)^ (P  P
c
). The rst conjunct is a clause of
Step, and the others were shown to be implied by Step in the previous lemmas, so
Step) R.
We now show that (L  L
c
) ^ (Step ^R
0
)) (L  L
c
)
0
. If :r
0
l
, then L
0
c
= L
0
m
by a clause
of Level. Knowing :r
0
l
also gives us :f
0
l
, by a conjunct of R
0
, and therefore L
0
 L
0
m
,
giving L
0
 L
0
c
. If r
0
l
, then L
0
c
= L
c
+ (P
0
c
  S
0
c
). By L  L
c
, R
0
, and since + and   are
monotonic on ranges, we have that L+ (P
0
  S
0
)  L
c
+ (P
0
c
  S
0
c
), so L
0
 L
0
c
.
Applying the derived proof rule we get (L  L
c
) ^2Step) 2(L  L
c
). Furthermore,
L  L
c
holds initially, giving Init ^2Step) 2(L  L
c
). 2
Theorem 3 BSys) Safety
Proof.
BSys ) 2Step by def. of BSys
) 2(up) L
c
 Safe) by def. of Shutdown
BSys ) 2(L  L
c
) Lemma ??
BSys ) 2(up) L  Safe) by TLA rule STL5 and trans. of 
2
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6 Failure Assumptions and Consistency Conditions
We have shown some important safety properties of the boiler system relative to some
failure assumptions. As mentioned in the Introduction, the probability that the
assumptions hold could be estimated, allowing an overall estimate of system safety to be
made. We will not perform a probabilistic analysis here, but will review the failure
assumptions we have made and the related consistency conditions.
First, we have assumed that devices report values within their specied accuracy when
they have not failed. Estimating the likelihood of this condition holding would probably
be possible.
Second, we have assumed that failed devices report inconsistent values. Calculating the
likelihood of this assumption holding is likely to be dicult, as a detailed knowledge of
the likelihood and behaviour of failure modes is needed. Furthermore, the system context
is relevant. For example, a meter that fails to a 0 reading will produce a consistent failure
in contexts where a 0 reading is expected.
Third, we have assumed that inconsistencies arise only in the presence of failures. The
diculty of assessing this assumption depends on the particular consistency conditions
adopted.
The consistency conditions play no part in the deterministic analysis, but do aect the
probabilistic analysis. The conditions chosen in our model could certainly be augmented.
For example, the conditions c
p
and c
l
could be strengthened by additionally requiring
that the change in pump and level values in the last step are within a certain range.
The condition c
spl
holds when the level meter reading is consistent with the old level
reading and the calculated net ow. Note that this condition depends on values in both
the current and previous states. The use of values from the current and previous state in
determining consistency could be extended so that a sequence of past values is used. For
example, a sequence of ow values could be recorded and tested. An important part of
the design of the boiler system is the selection of consistency conditions that are easy to
compute and likely to uncover device failures. Furthermore, a good consistency condition
is one for which it is possible to estimate the probability that the condition fails just
when some device fails.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a specication for a boiler system model and have shown that it
possesses some important safety properties. The process of formalising the system
properties helped to clarify some key issues. For example, should all possibly failed
devices be reported, or just the the smallest set of devices having at least one failed
device? The latter reduces unnecessary diagnosis and repair, but was found to be
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if level meter ok then L
c
:= level meter reading
else if steam meter ok then S
c
:= steam meter reading
else S
c
:= physical steam limit
if pump mon's ok then P
c
:= sum of pump mon. readings
else P
c
:= sum of physical pump limits
L
c
:= L
c
+ (P
c
  S
c
)
Figure 1: The Level Calculation in Pseudo-code
inadequate to ensure the main safety property.
The process of proving the properties was also benecial. Attempting the proofs often
uncovered missing details, such as initial conditions. On the other hand, superuous
parts of the specication were found by examining the nished proofs, and noting the
dependencies on the specication. For example, we had initially included a single-failure
assumption in the model, and realised later, after looking at our proofs, that this
assumption was not needed.
Some parts of the model are generic and could be used for other systems. The data fusion
model embodies a general strategy for detecting failure from inconsistencies between
measured values. We chose a pessimistic strategy that reports a device failed if a
measurement from the device is inconsistent with other values. Less pessimistic strategies
may be better in other contexts. For example, another strategy is to select the smallest
set of devices such that some device in the set is guaranteed to have failed. Thus if the
:c
spl
and :c
pl
, the devices p and l might be reported as failed, but not s. Failure
assumptions could also be incorporated into data fusion model, allowing a smaller set of
devices to be reported as failed. For example, if :c
sp
and :c
sl
, and if f
l
implies :f
s
and
:f
p
, then one can conclude that s has denitely failed.
The level calculation strategy is also quite generic. This strategy is related to various
software fault-tolerance schemes, such as recovery blocks [?, ?]. The resemblance may be
easier to see if the strategy is given in pseudo-code (see Figure ??) rather than in logic.
In a recovery block, alternative computations are tried until an acceptable result is
delivered. Here, alternative computations are ordered according to the accuracy of the
result. A specic computation is chosen according to which devices have failed.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by SERC/IED project 1224, \Mathematically Proven Safety
Systems".
9
Appendix A Some TLA Proof Rules
STL1
F provable by propositional logic
F
STL2 ` 2F ) F
STL3 ` 22F  2F
STL4
F ) G
2F ) 2G
STL5 ` 2(F ^ G)  (2F ) ^ (2G)
STL6 ` (32F )^ (32G)  32(F ^ G)
INV1
P ^ A ) P
0
P ^2A ) 2P
INV2 ` 2P ) (2A  2(A ^ P ^ P
0
))
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